In 2 diary studies of lying, 77 college students reported telling 2 lies a day, and 70 community members told 1. Participants told more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies, except in dyads involving only women, in which other-oriented lies were as common as self-centered ones. Participants told relatively more self-centered lies to men and relatively more other-oriented lies to women. Consistent with the view of lying as an everyday social interaction process, participants said that they did not regard their lies as serious and did not plan them much or worry about being caught. Still, social interactions in which lies were told were less pleasant and less intimate than those in which no lies were told.
have yet to be answered with compelling data. These questions include the following: How often do people lie? What do they lie about? Whom do they lie about? To whom do they tell their lies and in what contexts? What reasons do they offer for telling their lies?
We set out to address basic questions about lying in everyday life by using a daily diary methodology that has been used successfully in the study of diverse topics in social, personality, and developmental psychology (Kashy, 1991; Reis & Wheeler, 1991; Tennen, Suls, & Affleck, 1991) . We asked participants to keep records of all their social interactions, and all of the lies that they told during those social interactions, every day for a week. They also described their partners in their social interactions, the targets of their lies, and their reasons for telling their lies. We collected these data from two very different samples of participants.
Our theoretical orientation to the study of lying in everyday life was drawn from perspectives on identity, self-presentation, and impression management from sociology (Goffman, 1959) , linguistics (Brown & Levinson, 1987) , and social psychology (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) . From these perspectives, the "self" that is presented to others in everyday social life is characteristically an edited and packaged one. In nondeceptive presentations, the editing serves to specify and highlight the aspects of the self that are most relevant to the interaction at hand, without being designed to mislead. By comparison, the denning characteristic of the deceptive presentation is that it is purposefully designed to foster a false impression.
Many of the same goals that motivate nondeceptive presentations also motivate deceptive ones. These include the claiming of desired identities, the support of other people's claims to desired identities, and the exchange of enhancing and supportive emotions, preferences, and opinions. When reality is kind (e.g., when people want to present themselves as generous and caring when they really do have a long history of charitable contribu-lions and benevolent acts), these goals can be accomplished nondeceptively; however, under less propitious circumstances, it becomes more tempting to lie. Because these kinds of goals arc so fundamental to ordinary social discourse, and because reality is often unkind, we expected to find that lying is a fact of social life. We anticipated that our participants would describe lying as an everyday occurrence rather than as an extraordinary or unusual event.
In the popular press, as well as in the literature on ethics, lying often is described as a selfish act. People lie, it is assumed, to get jobs, promotions, raises, good grades, and better commissions. We, too, believe that lies are more often told to serve the self than to benefit others. However, we think that lies are less often told in the pursuit of goals such as financial gain and material advantage and instead are much more often told in the pursuit of psychic rewards such as esteem, affection, and respect.
We also think that the portrayal of everyday lies as disruptive of social life and hurtful to the targets of the lies is in need of modification. In keeping with the perspective described by Goffman (1959) and other social interaction theorists, we think that many of the lies of everyday life are told to avoid tension and conflict and to minimize hurt feelings and ill-will (Lippard, 1988; Metts, 1989) . We think that people lie frequently about their feelings, preferences, and opinions and that when they do so, they are far more likely to feign a positive appraisal than a negative one.
If we are correct in assuming that lies are a fact of social life, then we should find that they are of only minor cognitive or emotional significance to the people who tell them. As with other well-practiced behaviors, everyday lies should require little planning. We expect people to describe their lies as not serious, to report low levels of distress before and after telling their lies, and to report little desire to undo their lies if they could. We also think that they will feel little concern about the possibility of getting caught and instead will expect to be believed.
Although lying is a commonplace strategy for managing impressions and social interactions, it is less common than nondeceptive techniques. It is a more extreme form of impression management that involves the deliberate fostering of a false impression rather than the judicious editing of a true one. It is likely to occur in situations that are a bit more taxing than ones in which social interaction goals can readily be accomplished in nondeceptive ways. Furthermore, in this culture. lying is generally condemned. Several consequences might follow from these circumstances. First, social interactions in which lies are told will differ in undesirable ways from those in which no lies are told; specifically, they will seem less pleasant and less intimate. Second, people will show some avoidance of the most direct modes of social interaction when telling lies; for example, they might prefer telling their lies in a letter or by telephone instead of in face-to-face interactions. Finally, people might feel a twinge of distress while they are telling their lies that they did not feel just before or immediately afterward.
Just as people are unrealistically optimistic about so many other aspects of their lives (Taylor, 1989) , so, too, might they be optimistic about their lying. At the end of their week of recordkeeping, we asked participants how often they think they lie relative to other people their age. We expected participants to say that on the average, they tell fewer lies than do others.
Sex Differences in Lying
The cumulative results of hundreds of studies converge to support the theoretical statement (e.g., Bakan, 1966) and popular perception that women are the socioemotional specialists in American culture. Women interact in more intimate ways with other people than do men (Reis, in press ). They self-disclose more (Dindia & Allen, 1992) and give more social support-especially emotional support-to others (Reis, in press ). They also are warmer nonverbally; they smile and gaze more at their listeners, approach others more closely, and touch others more, and their facial expressions are especially expressive and legible (Hall, 1984 ; see also DePaulo, 1992 , for a self-presentational interpretation). It has been argued that many sex differences can be attributed to the differential distribution of men and women into different social roles and that when men and women occupy the same roles, they will behave similarly (Eagly, 1987) . The evidence for this position is compelling with regard to agentic behaviors such as dominance and leadership (Eagly, 1987) , but less so for communal behaviors such as agreeableness and quarrelsomeness. In a pair of studies of men and women in their occupational roles, Moskowitz, Suh, and Desaulniers (1994) found that women were more communal (more agreeable and less quarrelsome) than men and that this sex difference was not qualified by social role: Women were equally more communal than men whether they were in a supervisory, subordinate, or collegial role.
Women are not only more likely to offer intimacy in their interactions with others, but they also are more likely to receive it. Both men and women regard their interactions with women as being more meaningful than their interactions with men (Reis, in press), they self-disclose more to women (Dindia & Allen, 1992) , they are nonverbally warmer to women (Hall, 1984) , and they offer women more social and emotional support (Reis, in press) .
It has been suggested that the most pronounced differences between men and women should occur not when they are interacting with each other, but instead when they are in same-sex pairs or groups. Maccoby (1990) noted that sex segregation is pervasive throughout childhood (and continues to be important even in adulthood) and that in segregated same-sex groupings, males and females learn characteristic ways of interacting. There is some supportive evidence for this position. For example, sex differences in dominance and friendliness (Moskowitz, 1993) , in communal behaviors (Moskowitz et al., 1994) , and in nonverbal behaviors (Hall, 1984) all have been found to be more pronounced in same-sex than in opposite-sex interactions. The interactions that are most conducive to intimacy, then, may be those in which women are interacting with other women.
The intimacy that characterizes interactions involving women seems at first blush to be completely inconsistent with lying. Self-disclosure, for example, is the process of revealing oneself to others, whereas lying is a process of falsifying and concealing. Social support is a process of offering kindness, comfort, and aid to others, whereas lying involves a unilateral decision to withhold valid information. One hypothesis that might follow from this construal is that women will lie less often than men, particularly when they are interacting with other women.
There is, however, some evidence that is inconsistent with the prediction that women, more so than men, will refrain from telling lies. For example, in a study in which men and women talked about paintings that they detested with the art students who had painted them, women were more likely than men to lie about their opinions of the paintings (DePaulo & Bell, 1993) . They were not, however, any more inclined than men to communicate untruthfully when the paintings were ones that they liked or when the paintings were ones that were created by other artists. The pattern of deceit in this study suggested that the women's lying may have been motivated by their concern for the artists; they seemed to be lying to avoid criticizing the artists and hurting their feelings. On the basis of this study as well as the results from a psychologically similar paradigm in which children received a disappointing gift (Cole, 1986; Saarni, 1984) , DePaulo, Epstein, and Wyer (1993) suggested the possibility that one of the ways that women foster intimacy and supportiveness in their interactions with others is by telling lies. The specific prediction is that women, relative to men, tell more of the kinds of lies that are intended to benefit other people, lies that are flattering, comforting, and protective. The research we report provides a broad-ranging test of that hypothesis as it pertains to the many different lies of everyday life.
To learn whether women lie more or less than men, and whether the kind of lying that occurs when women are with other women differs from that which occurs when men are involved, it is essential to know whether women have the same number of opportunities to lie to men and women as do men. Every social interaction is an opportunity to tell a lie, and it has been amply demonstrated that rates of socializing differ markedly in different kinds of dyads and groups (e.g., Reis & Wheeler, 1991) . If, for example, it were found that women told twice as many lies as men, this finding would have much different implications if women also interacted with other people twice as often as men did, compared with equally often or half as often. Although there have been several previous studies in which participants kept records of their lies for a specified period of time {e.g., Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; Lippard, 1988) , there are none that we know of that also included a measure of opportunities to lie.
Method

Participants
Participants in Study 1 were 30 male and 47 female undergraduates who participated in partial fulfillment of a requirement for an introductory psychology course. They ranged in age from 17 to 22 {M = 18.69 years, SD = 0.91 years). Sixty-four were White, 9 were Black, and 4 described themselves as "other" than White or Black. The 77 participants did not include 1 man who completed only 2 days of the 7-day record-keeping assignment.
Participants in Study 2 were 30 men and 40 women who were recruited via advertisements posted at a local community college, from lists of people who had taken continuing education courses, and from lists of names selected randomly from the area telephone directory. They ranged in age from 18 to 71 (M= 34.19 years, SD= 12.49 years). Sixty-seven were White and 3 were Black. Other demographic information was based on 5 3 of the 70 participants; 17 were inadvertently given an incomplete questionnaire. Of those who did answer the complete questionnaire, 81% were employed, 57% were married, 47% had children, and 34% had no more than a high school education. The 70 participants in Study 2 did not include 1 man who said that he had recorded only about 10% of his social interactions and 5% of his lies.
Procedure
Phase 1: Introduction to the study. The Study I participants and the participants from Study 2 who were recruited from the community college initially responded to notices describing the research that were posted in an academic building. The study was described as one in which they would keep records of their social interactions and communications for 7 days. In Study 1 the notice indicated that participants would receive partial course credit for their participation, and in Study 2 it indicated that participants would be paid $35. Study 2 participants recruited from continuing education lists or from the phone directory were sent letters with the same description of the research; they then were contacted by telephone about a week later.
All participants attended an initial 90-min meeting in which the study and the procedures were explained. (Participants also completed several individual-differences measures reported in Kashy & DePaulo, 1996 . ) i n Study 1, these were group sessions attended by 10-15 participants at a time. The Study 2 sessions were conducted individually or in small groups.
Participants were told that they would be recording all of their social interactions and all of the lies that they told during those interactions every day for a week. It was noted that their role in this research was especially important in that they would be the observers and recorders of their own behavior. The investigators explained that they did not condone or condemn lying; rather, they were studying it scientifically to learn the answers to some of the most fundamental questions about the phenomenon. They encouraged the participants to think of the study as an unusual opportunity to learn more about themselves.
The key terms were then explained to the participants. A "social interaction" was defined as "any exchange between you and another person that lasts 10 min or more . . . in which the behavior of one person is in response to the behavior of another person." This definition, plus many of the examples used to clarify the definition, were taken or adapted from the ones used in the initial studies involving the Rochester Interaction Record (RIR) (Wheeler & Nezlek, 1977) . We did add an exception to the 10-min rule, which was that for any interaction in which participants told a lie, they also were to fill out a social interaction record, even if the interaction lasted less than 10 min. (For the college students and community members respectively, 8.9% and 10.5% of their lies were told during interactions lasting 10 min or less. ) To explain what participants should count as a lie, it was noted that "a lie occurs any time you intentionally try to mislead someone. Both the intent to deceive and the actual deception must occur." Many examples were given. Participants were urged to record all lies, no matter how big or how small. They were instructed that if they were uncertain as to whether a particular communication qualified as a lie, they should record it. (At the end of the study, two of the investigators independently read through all of the lie diaries and agreed on the few that did not meet the definition and excluded them.) The definition that we gave participants was interpreted broadly as encompassing any intentional attempts to mislead, including even nonverbal ones. The only example of a lie they were asked not to record was saying "fine" in response to perfunctory "How are you?" questions. Participants completed one deception record for every lie that they told.
Participants were instructed to fill out the forms (social interaction records and deception records) at least once a day. The forms were then collected by the experimenters at several different times throughout the week. Participants also were given pocket-sized notebooks and encouraged to write reminders of their social interactions and their lies as soon as possible after the events had taken place. They could then use their notes as a memory aid if they did not complete their social interaction and deception records until later in the day. The notebooks were not collected.
Several additional steps were taken to encourage the reporting of all lies. First, participants were told that if they did not wish to reveal the contents of any of the lies that they told, in the space on the deception record in which they were to describe their lie, they could instead write "rather not say." That way, we would still know that a lie was told as well as other information about the lie and the social interaction in which it was told (from the other parts of the records that the participants completed). Second, we instructed participants that if they did not completely remember everything about a He that they told, they should still fill out as much of the information on the form as they could. Third, we told participants that if they remembered a lie from a previous day that they had not recorded, they should still turn in a form for that lie.
The importance of accuracy and conscientiousness in keeping the records was emphasized throughout the session. To ensure anonymity, participants chose their own identification number, which they used throughout the study. Participants did not write their names on any of the forms. At the end of the session, the investigators reviewed the amount of time it would take to complete all phases of the study and encouraged participants to terminate their participation at that point if they no longer had the interest or the time to participate fully. They were offered credit or payment even if they chose not to continue. All participants elected to continue.
Participants were given typed copies of all of the instructions and definitions they had been given during the session. This instruction booklet also included names and phone numbers of members of the research team whom they could contact at any time with any questions. Appointments also were made with each participant to meet with a researcher in approximately 3 days to drop off completed social interaction forms and check on any questions related to the study. Researchers also were available to collect forms at other times. Appointments also were made with all of the Study 1 participants to return once more at the end of the 7-day recording period to complete a final set of measures. Study 2 participants were shown an envelope and instructions that would be mailed to them at the end of the study, so that they could complete the same measures.
Phase 2: Retarding social interactions and lies. During the 7-day recording period, which began the day after the introductory session, participants completed a social interaction record for all of their social interactions and a deception record for all of their lies.
The social interaction record was adapted from the R1R (Wheeler & Nezlek, 1977) . On each record, participants wrote their identification number, the date, the time, and the duration of the interaction. For interactions involving three or fewer other people, participants recorded the initials and the sex of each of those persons. For interactions with more than three other people, participants simply recorded the total number of male and female interaction partners. Participants then indicated how intimate the interaction was on a 9-point scale ranging from superficial (1) to meaningful (9). They also rated the quality of the interaction on a scale with endpoints labeled unpleasant (1) and pleasant (9) and indicated the degree to which the participant influenced the other person (s) more (1) or the other person (s) influenced the participant more (9). They also indicated whether the interaction took place in writing, by telephone, or face to face.
Printed on the same page as the social interaction record was the deception record. Participants again indicated the initials and gender of the person or people to whom they told their lie. Below this were spaces to "Briefly describe the lie" and "Briefly describe the reason why you told the lie." Next were nine 9-point rating scales. Participants rated their degree of planning of the lie on a scale with endpoints labeled completely spontaneous (1) and carefully planned in advance (9). They then indicated the importance of not getting caught, from very unimportant (1) to very important (9). On the next three scales, they reported their feelings before the lie was told, while telling the lie, and after the lie was told on a scale with endpoints labeled very comfortable (1) and very uncomfortable (9). They also rated the seriousness of the lievery trivial, unimportant lie {1) to very serious, important lie (9)-and the target's reaction to the lie-didn 't believe me at all (I) to believed me completely (9). Finally, they answered two questions-"How would the target have felt if you told the truth instead of the lie?" and "How would you have felt if you told the truth instead of a lie?"-on scales with endpoints labeled much better if I told the truth (1) and much worse if I told the truth (9).
Phase 3: Additional measures. After the completion of the 7-day recording period, participants were asked to respond to one more set of measures. First, they were asked to fill out a form (not relevant to this article) describing the characteristics of each of the persons with whom they had interacted. Next, participants were given photocopies of each of their deception records and they answered two questions about each lie: "Was this lie ever discovered?" (no, not yet; don't know; or yes) and "If you could relive this social interaction, would you tell the lie again?" (no or yes).
Next, participants completed a questionnaire on which they indicated, on 9-point scales, how successful they thought they were at lying and how frequently they thought they had lied relative to what they had expected and relative to other people their age. They also indicated the percentage of their social interactions and their lies that they actually had recorded. (We urged them to be honest about this because il would help us to know the correct answers to these questions even if the percentages were low.) Finally, they indicated the average amount of time they had spent each day filling out all of the social interaction forms and the deception records.
The Study I participants returned to the laboratory to complete these forms. Afterward, they were interviewed by one of the investigators who tried to determine the extent to which the participants had understood and complied with the procedure and believed the information they had been given about the research. This extensive interview uncovered no problems with the procedure. Therefore, in Study 2, all of the forms from this phase of the study were mailed to the participants, and a written debrief (plus payment) was included in the package.
Coding the Lies
Developing the taxonomy. The development of a taxonomy of lies was a multistep process in which we (a) developed a preliminary taxonomy and codebook on the basis of previous taxonomic efforts, our own theoretical framework, and pilot testing; (b) coded a sample of 100 lies from the first study and modified the taxonomy as necessary; (c) trained research assistants to code all of the lies from both studies according to the new taxonomy; (d) reviewed all of the coding for consistency, adding necessary clarifications to the codebook; and (e) trained a coder in the use of the final taxonomy, including practice at coding 50 sample items. The reliabilities (kappas) reported in Table 1 were based on the relationship between that person's codings of 215 lies drawn about equally from the two studies and the actual codings of those lies (from Steps c and d) that were used in the analyses.
Kinds of lies.
Participants' open-ended descriptions of their lies and their reasons for telling them were classified in four different ways. The content, type, and referent of the lie were coded primarily from the description of the lie itself. The reasons for the lie were coded from participants' self-described reasons for telling their lies. Subcategories Lies about affects, emotions, opinions, and evaluations pertaining to people, objects, or events. Includes feigning feelings and appraisals that are more positive or less negative than they are, as well as the converse of feigning less positivity or more negativity (.85). Example: "Told her her muffins were the best ever." Lies about achievements, accomplishments, failures, shortcomings, knowledge, and lack of knowledge (.71). Example: "I told him I had done poorly on my calculus homework when I had aced it." Lies about what the liars did, are doing, or are planning to do, or about where they were or where they are (.65). Example: "Said I would go out with him sometime but I won't." Lies about liars' reasons or explanations for their behavior (.49). Example: "I told him I didn't take out our garbage because I didn't know where to take it." Lies about facts about objects, events, or people, or about possessions (.64). Example: "Told him my father was an ambassador." Lies told to protect or enhance the liars psychologically, or to advantage or protect the liars' interests; lies told to elicit a particular emotional response that the liars desired (.69). The lies told for psychological reasons included lies told to protect the liars from embarrassment, loss of face, or looking bad; from disapproval or having their feelings hurt; from worry, conflict, or other unpleasantness; lies told to protect the liar's privacy; to make the liars appear better (or just different) than they are; and to regulate the liars' own feelings, emotions, and moods (.68). Lies told for reasons of personal advantage included lies told for the liar's personal gain, to make things easier or more pleasant for the liars, or to help them get information or get their way; lies told to protect the liars from physical punishment or to protect their property, assets, or safety; lies told to protect the liars from loss of status or position or to protect them from being bothered or from doing something they preferred not to do (.67). Example (psychological): Lie: "I told her Ted and I still liked each other when really I don't know if he likes me at all."
Reason: "Because I'm ashamed of the fact that he doesn't like me anymore." Example (personal advantage): Lie: "Lady on phone asked if a number was my current phone number. I said yes when in fact it isn't." Reason: "I want to make it hard for her to find me; they are after me for money." Lies told to protect or enhance other persons psychologically or to advantage or protect the interests of others (.68). The lies told for psychological reasons included lies told to protect another person from embarrassment, loss of face, or looking bad; from disapproval or having their feelings hurt; from worry, conflict, or other unpleasantness; lies told to protect another person's privacy; to make other people appear better (or just different) than they are; and to regulate another person's feelings, emotions, or moods. The lies told for another person's advantage included lies told for another person's personal gain, to make things easier or more pleasant for others, to be accommodating, or to help them get their way; lies told to protect others from physical punishment or to protect their property, assets, or safety; lies to protect others from loss of status or position or to protect them from being bothered or from doing something they preferred not to do. Example (psychological): Lie: 'Told her she looked well, voice sounded good when she looks less well than a few weeks ago." Reason: "Not to add worry as she undergoes chemotherapy treatments." Example (another person's advantage): Lie: "Lied about cost per square foot." Reason: "To make money for the company." Total falsehoods; lies in which the information conveyed is completely different from, or contradictory to, the truth (.50). Example: "I told my mother that I did not drink beer at college." Lies in which liars overstate the facts or convey an impression that exceeds the truth (.42). Example: "Exaggerated how sorry I was to be late." Lying by evading or omitting relevant details and by telling literal truths that are designed to mislead. Also includes behavioral or nonverbal lies (.60). Example: "He and I discussed sexual acts that 1 had performed, but he assumed that they had been performed with a 4. Referent" Liar L i e s that refer to something about the lie teller, such as something the liar did or felt. Includes lies in which the liars state or imply their preferences or opinions (.68). Example: "I led a girl to believe that I was a model with a New York agency." Target L i e s that refer to something about the target of the lie (.72). Example: "Told customer it was her color." Other person L i e s that refer to something about a person or persons other than the liar or target (.63). Example:' Said this guy liked her when he really hates her guts." Object, event L i e s that refer to something about an object, event, or place (.64). Example: "Disagreed when she told me my drawing was good even though 1 thought it was."
Note. Reliabilities (kappas) are indicated at the end of each definition. According to Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981) , kappas greater than .75 are excellent; those ranging from .60 to .74 are good; those between .40 and .59 are fair; and those under .40 are poor. a A third category of "neither self-centered nor other-oriented" also was coded, but those results are not relevant to this article. That category included lies told to control an interaction, to create an effect (e.g., to entertain), to conform to conventions, or to simplify a response. Also coded but not included in the analyses were instances in which participants said they did not know why they told the lie. b Lies told to bother or annoy others or to cause them psychological damage (e.g., Lie: "Told him the boss wanted to talk to him, but he really didn't." Reason: "So he'd look like a fool.") were not included. Only .84% of the lies in Study 1 and 2.39% in Study 2 were of this nasty variety. c Understatements, lies in which liars "play down" the truth or give less than an honest impression (e.g., "Said I did OK on an exam-I got an A"), also were coded but were excluded from the analyses because of poor reliability (* = .14). 6 Lies were coded into as many of the four categories as they fit. Table 2 shows the basic descriptive data on the number of lies, social interactions, and partners for the participants in both samples. As predicted, lying was an everyday event. College students reported lying in approximately one out of every three of their social interactions, and people from the community lied in one out of every five social interactions. Table 2 also shows the basic statistics separately for men and women and for dyadic lies in which men and women told lies to men or women. For the key variable of number of lies per social interaction, there were no significant effects involving sex of the participant or target.
Rate of Lying
Self-Percept ions of Lying
When we asked participants at the end of the study how successful they thought they were as liars, they generally rated themselves as fairly successful (see Table 3 ). Participants also said that they lied less frequently than they expected, and, as we predicted, they also said that they lied less frequently than others their age. For both samples, the mean was significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, t(16) = 2.57, p = .01, for the college students, and t(70) = 2.22, p -.03, for the community members. In the community sample, the men (compared with the women) thought that they lied especially less frequently To determine whether participants' self-perceptions would be consistent with their actually lie-telling behavior, we correlated their answers to the question about how frequently they thought they lied relative to others their age with the actual number of lies that they told and with the number of lies that they told relative to the number of social interactions. As shown in Table  2 , all of these correlations were positive and many were significant. (Tests of the differences between correlations for men and women were not significant.) Therefore, there was some correspondence between participants' perceptions of their lying and their actual rate of lying.
Comparing Social Interactions in Which Lies Were or Were Not Told
To compare qualities of the interactions when lies were and were not told, for each participant a mean score on each interaction measure was computed across all interactions involving lies. A second set of means was computed averaging over all interactions that did not involve lies. Correlated t tests were then conducted on the participants' average responses. As predicted, participants in both studies described the interactions in which they told no lies as more intimate and more pleasant than the interactions during which they lied (see Table 4 ). Both the social interactions that included lies and those that did not were overwhelmingly face-to-face interactions. Interactions by telephone were less frequent, and communications in writing were the least frequent. Still, as predicted, the relative use of closer communication modalities varied significantly according to whether lies were or were not being told. For both studies, the interactions during which lies were told (compared with those during which no lies were told) were relatively more likely to involve the more distant modality of the telephone and relatively less likely to involve the closer modality of face-to-face interaction. An exception to our predictions was that there were no differences in the use of written communication as a function of whether lies were or were not told.
Kinds of Lies
Similarities between the studies. Table 5 shows the percentages of each kind of He for each category of content, reason, type, and referent for both studies. The relative frequencies of the different subcategories of lies were highly similar for the two studies. For the 14 subtypes taken together, the correlation between the percentages for the college sample and the community sample was .95 (df= 12),/? = .0001.
Content of the lies. The results for the coding of the content of the lies show that for both studies, people reported lying most often about their feelings; their actions, plans, and whereabouts; and their achievements and knowledge (see Table 5 ). We predicted that when participants lied about their feelings, they would pretend to feel more positively than they really did more often than they would pretend to feel more negatively. To test this, we created subcategories of "feelings." The positive subcategory included lies in which people pretended to like someone or something more than they really did; faked a positive emotion that they did not really feel; pretended to have a more positive opinion than they actually did; and pretended to be more interested in a topic or a person or an event than they actually were. When people claimed that they did not mind something, when in fact they did, that, too, was included in the faking positive subcategory. The faking negative subcategory included the parallel negative categories (e.g., lies in which people pretended to dislike someone more than they really did). (The kappa reliabilities for these subcategories were .93 for faking positive and .66 for faking negative.)
For each participant we computed the number of fake positive lies told and the number of fake negative lies told. These totals were then divided by the total number of lies told and used in a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which sex of participant was a between-subjects variable and faking positive versus faking negative was a within-subjects variable. (Because this analysis included nondyadic lies in which partners were sometimes both men and women, as well as dyadic lies, sex of partner was not included as a variable.) For the means that we report, we multiplied the proportions by 100 to produce percentages.
The main effect for type of faking was significant for both studies, F(\, 74)= 57.95, MSE = 0.027, p < .001, for the college students, and F( 1, 62) = 40.03, MSE = 0.039, p < .001. for the community members. On average, 25.23% of college students' lies involved faking positive, and 2.98% of their lies involved faking negative. For the community sample, the corresponding values were highly similar: The mean for faking positive was 23.79 and that for faking negative was 1.19. In addition, a nearly significant interaction between sex of participant and direction of faking emerged only for the college sample, F{ 1, 74) = 3.69. MSE = 0.027, p = .06, such that women were more likely to fake positive than were men (the means for fake positive for men and women were 19.33 and 28.87, respectively; those for fake negative for men and women were 3.63 and 2.58, respectively).
To determine whether the content of the lies varied with the sex composition of the dyad, we created separate variables for each kind of He for each kind of dyad. For the feelings variable, for example, the number of lies about feelings that men told to other men was divided by the total number of lies that men told to other men; comparable variables then were computed for male-female (MF), female-male (FM), and female-female (FF) dyads. The resulting values were the dependent measures in the ANOVAs in which sex of the participant was a between-subjects variable and sex of partner was a within-subjects variable.
3 As shown in Table  6 , there were no significant effects for any content category that were consistent across the two studies.
Reasons for the lies. We predicted that participants would tell more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies but that women would tell relatively more other-oriented lies and relatively fewer self-centered lies than would men. A mixed-model ANOVA (sex of participant, self-vs. otheroriented lies) showed that the predicted main effect for type of reason was significant for both studies, F( 1, 74) = 18.62, MSE = 0.100, p < .001, for the college students, and F(\, 62) -21.68, MSE = 0.143, p < .001, for the community members. For the college students, 45.53% of the lies were self-centered, compared with 25.74% that were other-oriented. For the community sample, the corresponding percentages were 56.68 and 24.45. The prediction that the women would tell relatively more other-oriented lies than the men was supported only for the college sample, F( 1, 74) = 5.67, MSE = 0.100,/? = .02 (for the community sample, F < 1). For the college men, 50.57% of their lies were selfcentered, compared with 15.25% that were other-oriented; for the women, the corresponding percentages were 42.42 and 32.21, respectively.
We also predicted that of the self-centered lies that participants told, more of them would be told for psychological reasons, such as those relevant to self-presentational and emotional concerns, than for the pursuit of personal material advantage or personal convenience. To test this, we created subcategories of 3 To determine whether the lies that were told to just one person differed in kind from the lies that were told to more than one person, we computed two values for each participant. First, for only dyadic interactions, the number of lies falling into a particular category (i.e., lies about feelings, explanations, outright lies, etc.) divided by the total number of lies told in dyadic interactions was calculated. A similar value for only those interactions involving multiple partners also was computed. These values then were entered into paired t tests contrasting the dyadic lies with the multiple-partner lies. For the undergraduate sample, only one significant difference emerged, indicating that lies referring to the target were more common in dyadic interactions than in multiple partner interactions, r( 64) = 2.71, p < .01. The mean percentage for dyadic lies was 25.99%, and for multiple partner lies it was 17.80%. None of the other tests approached statistical significance (p > .10). For the community sample, there also was a significant difference in the same direction between dyadic and nondyadic interactions in the percentage of lies that referred to the target, r (41) = 2.06, p = .05 (Ms = 27.31 and 18.97 for dyadic and multiple, respectively). Significant differences for lies referring to another person, /(41) = 3.07, p < .01, and to objects and events, /(41) = 2.05, p = .05, also emerged for the community sample, such that people told lies referring to other people more often in dyadic interactions (M = 29.04) than in nondyadic interactions (M 13.29), whereas they told lies about objects and events less often in dyadic (A/ = 45.98) than in nondyadic interactions (M = 54.92). Note. Within the referent category, lies were coded into as many subcategories as were relevant. Within the other categories, lies were coded into only one subcategory. Percentages do not sum to 100 for the categories with mutually exclusive codings because some of the lies could not be classified and because the percentages were computed for each participant (number of lies in that category divided by the total number of lies) and then averaged across participants.
self-centered lies (as described in Table 1 ). We then divided the number of lies each participant told for psychological reasons (and then for reasons of personal advantage) by the total number of lies the participant told and entered these two values as a repeated measures variable (psychological and personal advantage) in ANOVAs that also included sex of participant as a between-subjects variable. As predicted, participants in both studies told more lies for psychological reasons than for reasons of personal advantage; for the college students, F( 1,74) = 4.27, MSE = 0.055, p = .04, and for the community members, F( 1, 62) = 7.71, MSE = 0.101, p=. 007. The means were 26.78 (SD = 20.83) and 18.61 (SD = 22.24) for psychological lies and personal advantage lies, respectively, for the college students, and 36.72 (SD = 31.26) and 19.95 (SD = 22.69) for the community members, respectively. Neither the participant sex main effect nor the interaction between reason and participant sex was significant for either sample.
To determine whether there would be sex composition effects in the reasons participants described for telling their dyadic lies, we computed Sex of Participant (between-subjects) X Sex of Partner (within-subjects) ANOV\s on the two major categories of reasons: self-centered and other-oriented. As shown in Table 6 , men told significantly more self-centered lies in the college student study and nonsignificantly more in the community study. Women told significantly more other-oriented lies in the college student study and nonsignificantly more in the community study. There were indications in both studies that participants told more self-centered lies to men than to women (ps -.04 and. 10 for the college and community studies, respectively). Participants in both studies told significantly more other-oriented lies to women than to men.
An analysis adding to the ANOVA a within-subjects variable with self-centered and other-oriented as levels produced a significant Partner Sex X Self-Other interaction for both studies, /"(1, 51) = 8.76, MSE = 0.077, p = .005, for the college study and F( 1, 40) = 4.94, MSE = 0.133, p = .03, for the community study. Therefore, the degree to which participants told relatively more self-centered lies to men, and relatively more other-oriented lies to women, was significant in both studies. The Sex of Participant X SelfOther interaction was significant only for the college study, F( 1, 51) = 7.86, MSE = 0.192, p = .007.
The pattern of means for both studies suggested that the dyads in which women lied to other women stood out from the others both in the low number of self-centered lies and the high number of other-oriented lies. Contrasts comparing the FF dyads with the average of the other three dyad types generally were significant. Women were especially likely to tell other-oriented lies to other women, F(1, 94) = 8.69, MSE = 0.082, p = .004, for Study 1, and F( 1, 78) = 7.11, MSE = 0.104, p = .009, for Study 2. In the college student study, women were especially unlikely to tell self-centered lies to other women, F(\, 94) = 7,42, MSE = 0.129, p = .008. This tendency was in the same direction, although not significantly so, in the community sample, F{ 1,78) -1.77, MSE = 0.155,/? = .19. Comparison of the differences between the percentage of self-centered lies and the percentage of other-oriented lies also indicated that the FF dyads were markedly different from the others in both studies. The means (self-centered minus other-oriented) for MM, MF, FM, and FF, respectively, were 58.35, 39.97, 28.34, and -0.42 for the college students and 38.20, 28.43, 41.59, and 0.79 for the community members. The contrast comparing the FF dyads with the three others was significant for both studies, F( 1, 94) = 11.31, MSE = 0.294, p= .001, for Study 1, and F( 1, 78) = 4.87, MSE = 0.395, p = .03, for Study 2. In summary, across both studies, in dyads that included men, participants told many more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies. By contrast, in the dyads that included only women, the rates of selfcentered and other-oriented lies were virtually identical.
Types of lies.
By far, the largest category of types of lies in both samples was outright lies (see also Lippard, 1988) . Sex of Participant X Sex of Partner ANOVAs on the dyadic lies produced just one (unpredicted) significant effect (see Table 6 ).
Referents of the lies. The vast majority of lies in both samples were about the liars. Sex of Participant X Sex of Partner ANOVAs on each of the four referent variables produced several significant findings (see Table 6 ). For example, the college students tended to tell more lies about people other than the liar or target to women than to men, but a significant interaction indicated that this was true only for the female participants. A contrast comparing the FF dyads with the other three kinds was significant, F( 1, 94) = 8.89, MSE = 0.048, p = .004. In Study 2, the same contrast was significant for lies about the target, F( 1, 78) = 4.16, MSE = 0.094, p = .04. In both instances, the lies about other people were more prominent in the FF dyads than in the other three.
Correlations Among the Kinds of Lies
What are the relationships among different kinds of lies? To answer this, we computed correlations using lies as units of analysis. (We did not compute correlations within categories, Note. The means are for dyadic interactions involving male participants (liars) with male partners (targets) (MM), male participants with female partners (MF), female participants with male partners (FM), and female participants with female partners (FF). Within the referent category, lies were coded into as many subcategories as were relevant. Within the other categories, lies were coded into just one subcategory. For the college sample, the dfs for the/ 7 ratios were 1,51: for the community sample F ratios, the dfs were 1,40. V < . 10. **/? < .05. **•/>< .01. such as the different kinds of contents, because the codings were mutually exclusive.) For example, we looked at whether lies that were about feelings (coded as 1 if they were and 0 if they were not)tended to be self-centered lies(coded as 1 if the lie was selfcentered and 0 if it was not). Because the sample sizes were so large (usually 1,058 for Study 1 and 477 for Study 2), most of the correlations were significant. However, the degrees of freedom based on those sample sizes were not the appropriate ones because lies told by any one participant were not independent.
To be conservative, we report here only the correlations that reached an absolute value of at least .20 for both studies. Note. The first nine variables were rated on 9-point scales, with higher numbers indicating more of the characteristic.
just faked positive feelings were counted); they also tended not to be self-centered lies (rs = -.29 and-.42, and -.23 and -.39 for positive only). Lies about feelings also tended to be about the target person (rs = .36 and .43, and .38 and .45 for positive only). Lies about the target person tended to be other-oriented lies (rs = .36 and .38) and tended not to be self-centered lies (rs = -.24 and -.31). Finally, lies about achievements tended not to be outright lies (rs = -.22 and -.23). Table 7 shows the characteristics of the lies as described by the participants using the 9-point rating scales and categories that were provided to them. The results underscore our contention that the lies of everyday life are mostly "light" lies that are not associated with much rumination or distress and that are generally successful. Participants said that they did not regard their lies as serious and that the level of distress they felt before, during, or after they told their lies was not high. Although they said that it was not important to them to avoid getting caught and that they did not put much planning into their lies, they thought that the targets believed them at the time that they told their lies, and, a week or so later, there were fewer than one in four of their lies (sometimes far fewer) that they knew for sure had been detected. These seemed to be lies of little or no regret: For more than 70% of the lies in both samples, participants said that if they could relive the situation, they would tell the lie again.
Characteristics of the Lies
Participants also tended to describe their lies as protective of the targets and of themselves; they claimed that both they and the targets of their lies would have felt a bit worse if the truth had been told instead of the lie. However, they also described greater protectiveness toward the target than toward themselves. They said that the targets especially would have felt even worse if the truth had been told instead of the He. The difference between participants' mean ratings on the "protect self" scale and their mean ratings on the "protect other" scale was significant for both studies, t(15) = 2.48, p -.02, for Study 1, and /(63) = 3.01,/? = .004, for Study 2.
To test our prediction that participants would feel more distressed while telling their lies than they would before or after they had told them, we compared participants' mean ratings of "distress during" to their mean ratings of "distress before"; similarly, we compared distress after with distress during and distress after with distress before. As predicted, participants felt more uncomfortable during the telling of their lies than they had just before they told them, f(75) = 5.45, p = .0001, for Study I, and f (63) =* 4.08, p = .001, for Study 2. However, their level of distress did not drop significantly from the time that they told their lies to the time directly afterward; therefore, after they had told their lies, they continued to feel significantly more uncomfortable than they had before, ?(75) = 3.71, p -.0004, for Study 1, and t(63) = 2.40, p -.02, for Study 2.
To test for sex of participant and sex of partner effects (using dyadic lies only), 5 we used a multilevel approach in which interactions were nested within partners and partners were nested within subjects (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, in press ). This analysis approach involved a series of hierarchically nested regressions. For example, consider the relationship between participant sex, partner sex, and the variable seriousness (i.e., how serious the participant reported the lie to be). In the first step, a regression equation was computed for each participant with interaction partner as the unit of analysis. In this regression, the mean seriousness score for all interactions with each partner was computed and served as the outcome measure. Partner sex (coded as males = -1 and females = 1) was the predictor variable. From these regressions, an intercept and a beta weight were derived for each participant; the intercept measured the average level of seriousness across all of the participant's partners, and the beta weight estimated the relationship between partner sex and the degree to which the participant felt the lie was serious (i.e., Were lies told to men considered to be more serious than lies told to women?).
The second step involved computing two regression equations, each of which had the participant as the unit of analysis. In the first, the intercepts from the first-step regressions were the criterion scores and participant sex was the predictor variable. This analysis yielded an estimate of the relationship between participant sex and seriousness in general. In the second regression equation, the beta weights from the first-step regressions were the criterion scores and, again, participant sex was the predictor variable. This analysis of the beta weights yielded an intercept that was the average effect of partner sex on 5 To determine whether the characteristics of the lies that were told to just one person differed from the characteristics of the lies that were told to more than one person, we computed for each participant in each study two means for each characteristic, one for only dyadic lies and one For lies told to multiple targets. We then computed correlated t tests on these pairs of means. Only two effects were significant. In Study 1, participants said that they were trying to protect themselves more with their dyadic lies (Ms = 5.57 and 5.23 for dyadic and multiple, respectively), ?<64) = 2.67, p = .01. In Study 2, participants said they felt more distress before telling their dyadic lies (Ms = 4.79 and 4.49 for dyadic and multiple, respectively), t(4l) = 2.00, p = .05. Note. The means are for dyadic interactions involving male participants (liars) with male partners (targets; MM), male participants with female partners (MF), female participants with male partners (FM), and female participants with female partners (FF). a Rated on 9-point scales, with higher numbers indicating more of the quality. b Percentage saying yes. c Answers were coded as 1 = no, 2 = don't know, and 3 = yes. The percentages of participants who said yes were 27.68, 17.73, 31.20, and 11.52, respectively, for the MM, MF, FM, and FF dyads for the college study and 10. 69, 18.70, 15.51, and 12.38 for the community study.
•p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.0l.
seriousness. In addition, the analysis yielded a regression coefficient that summarized the impact of the interaction between participant sex and partner sex on seriousness.
6 Table 8 shows the means for the four dyad types of all of the lie characteristics for both studies, as well as the significance tests. Two effects stand out as significant or nearly significant in both studies and in the same direction. First, the partner sex effect showed that when the participants were lying to women, they said that they were more likely to be protecting the target than when they were lying to men. That is, they thought that the women to whom they told their lies would have felt even worse if they had heard the truth instead of a lie. Second, the interaction of participant sex with partner sex on the distress-before variable showed that participants felt more distressed when they were about to lie to someone of the opposite sex than when they were about to lie to a same-sex target. Closer inspection of the means for the college students, however, indicated that this was so only for the female liars. In fact, once again, it was the FF dyad that differed most strikingly from the other three. The college students who felt least distressed before telling their lies were the women who were about to lie to another woman. The same pattern of means (and significance levels) occurred for the other two distress variables. College men's discomfort did not differ depending on whether their lies were to men or to women, but women felt less distress before, during, and after their lies when lying to other women. Other effects that were significant for just one sample are shown in Table 8 .
Discussion
Lying Is a Fact of Daily Life
The studies reported here provide some of the first data, and by far the most extensive data, on some of the most fundamental questions about lying in everyday life. As we expected, lying is a fact of daily life. Participants in the community study, on the average, told a lie every day; participants in the college student study told two. One out of every five times that the community members interacted with someone, they told a lie; for the college students, it was one out of every three times. Of all of the people the community members interacted with one on one over the course of a week, they lied to 30% of them; the college students lied to 38% of the people in their lives.
Lies Are Told for Psychic Rewards
What is the nature of these lies that people tell every day? We set out to devise a taxonomy of lies, guided by the literature dating as far back as St. Augustine, by theoretical considerations and by the kinds of lies that actually did appear in the participants' diaries. Most previous attempts to categorize lies have posited two different kinds of taxonomies, one of the types of lies (e.g., outright lies vs. exaggerations) and another of the motives for the lies. We, too, found that these taxonomies were important, but they left unaddressed two other questions that are readily answered from people's descriptions of their lies: What is the content of the lies (e.g., Are they about feelings? achievements?) and what is the referent of lies (e.g., Do people lie mostly about themselves, about the person to whom they are telling the lie, about other people, or about impersonal topics such as objects or events?).
The multifaceted taxonomies we created allow a more differentiated answer to the age-old issue of the alleged selfishness of liars and their lies. One simple measure of liars' self-centeredness is the frequency with which they lie about themselves-their own feelings, opinions, achievements, actions, and possessions. The answer to this question is straightforward: Liars lie overwhelmingly about themselves. Although many lies are about the liar and someone or something else, more than 80% of the lies that participants told in both studies were at least in part about themselves.
But what about motive-were these lies told to serve the liars' own self-interests? According to participants' own descriptions of their reasons for telling their lies, the lies were in fact mostly self-serving ones (see also Camden et al., 1984) . In both studies, about twice as many lies were told to benefit the liars as to benefit other people. Were these self-centered lies told specifically in the pursuit of material gain or personal convenience? To be conservative, we defined lies of "personal advantage" broadly because from our viewpoint, we expected them to occur relatively infrequently. From our perspective on lying as a behavior that serves everyday social interaction functions, such as selfpresentation and emotion regulation, we predicted that selfcentered lies would more often be told in the pursuit of psychic (rather than materialistic) benefits. That is, we expected people to lie to make themselves appear kinder or smarter or more honest than they believe themselves to be and to protect themselves from embarrassment or disapproval or conflict. In fact, in both studies, many more of participants' lies were told for psychological reasons than for reasons of personal advantage or convenience.
Other People Count, Too
Although participants told far more lies to benefit themselves in some way than to benefit others, still the number of otheroriented lies was not trivial. In both studies, close to one out of every four lies that participants told were told to benefit other people. Paralleling the lies that participants told for themselves, the lies told to benefit others were lies that protected them from embarrassment or worry or from having their feelings hurt. For every lie that they told, we asked participants to indicate (on rating scales) the degree to which they were protecting their own feelings by telling the lie (i.e., the degree to which they would have felt even worse if they had told the truth instead of the lie) and the degree to which they were protecting the other person's feelings. On this measure, participants in both studies described themselves as more concerned with the feelings of the targets of their lies than with their own feelings.
There was one other way in which liars' concerns about the targets of their lies became evident. At the top of the list of the contents of people's lies was the category of feelings. No content category in either study occurred more often than that of emotions, opinions, evaluations, and preferences. Furthermore, when people lied about their feelings, they overwhelmingly pretended to feel more positively, or more agreeably, than they did in fact. Importantly, these lies about feelings were disproportionately about the target person, and they also tended to be other-oriented lies and not self-centered ones. Lies about feelings, then, were about and for the target person.
Little Lies Are of Little Consequence
Because we expected lying to be an everyday social interaction process, as it was in fact, we also expected it to be infused with little cognitive or emotional baggage. In both studies, participants did indeed describe their lies in matter-of-fact ways. They said that their lies were generally not serious ones. They noted that they put little effort into planning them and did not worry much about the possibility of being caught. Instead, at the time of their lies, they reported that they expected to be believed. At the end of the study when we showed them their descriptions of each of their lies and asked them if, to their knowledge, the lies had been discovered, they reported that most of them had not been. Participants also reported at that point that they experienced little regret about their lies; when asked if they would tell the lie again if given a second chance, more than 70% said that they would. We are not suggesting that all of the lies of everyday life are little lies of little consequence; there was variability in all of our measures. However, the majority of them do seem to fit that description.
The Smudge
Although we think that lying serves basic social interaction functions such as impression management, emotion regulation, and social support, it is different in important ways from other nondeceptive means for achieving those goals. For example, when people use lying for impression management, they are not just editing their self-presentations to best fit the circumstances; instead, they are fashioning new and untrue selves. When people use lying to provide social support, the comfort they are offering is false; there is no genuine empathy behind the caring words. We think that these facts of lying, together with the morally perilous place that lying occupies in American culture, will leave their marks on the liars and on the social interactions in which they sprinkle their lies. First, we expected the liars to feel more distressed during the telling of their lies than just before or just after. In fact, participants in both studies felt more uncomfortable during their lies than they had just before. Their discomfort was a bit more enduring than we anticipated though; just after telling their lies, participants continued to feel their twinge of distress.
Second, we thought that the social interactions during which lies were told would be experienced as less pleasant and less intimate than those during which only the truth was conveyed. The results of both studies supported those predictions too. Finally, we thought that people might shy away from the closer communication modalities when they were telling lies. And, in fact, when participants in both studies were lying, they were relatively less likely to interact face to face than when they were telling the truth, and they were relatively more likely to communicate by telephone.
But Can We Believe Them?
It was important to us to elicit from our participants highly accurate and complete records of their lies. We took many steps to facilitate that. We explained what we meant by lying in great detail and gave participants printed definitions. We described our own perspective on lying as morally neutral. We described their role in the research as more akin to that of co-investigators than objects of our scrutiny. We continually emphasized the importance of accuracy and exhaustiveness and offered them the opportunity to withdraw from the study with compensation if they were not willing or able to participate conscientiously. We arranged the mechanics in ways that we thought would facilitate accuracy and thoroughness, too, from the small notebooks that we gave them to our safeguards of anonymity and our continuous availability to pick up forms and answer questions.
At the end of the study, we reassured the participants that it was fine if they had not recorded all of their social interactions or all of their lies and that it would help us to interpret the data more accurately to know what percentage of their social interactions and their lies they actually had recorded. Participants' answers to these questions were encouraging: On the average, they said that they had recorded about 86% and 89% of their social interactions (in Studies 1 and 2) and 89% and 92% of their lies. They also said that they had spent an average of 43 and 31 min a day keeping their records.
Still, despite our best efforts and our participants 1 claims of accuracy and thoroughness, our guess is that the 1,535 lies that we analyzed in these two studies was not the precise number of lies that the participants really did tell. Because of lapses in memory and conscientiousness, participants may have neglected to record some of their lies. There also may have been times when they did not even realize that they had told a lie. It seems likely, then, that participants actually told more lies than they recorded. If so, this would only strengthen our position that lying is an everyday behavior.
But are the kinds of lies that participants recorded biased in some way? The most plausible direction of this bias is that participants overreported their trivial and altruistic lies and underreported their serious and self-centered ones. We have no way of knowing whether this did in fact occur. However, the fact that participants described about twice as many self-centered lies as other-oriented ones suggests at least some willingness to own up to selfish motives. We also were encouraged by the similarities in the profiles of the kinds of lies that were described in the two studies. If participants biased their reports of their lies, they did so in uncannily similar ways in the two very different samples.
Sex Differences in Lying
The literature on sex differences has underscored the role of women as the socioemotional specialists in American culture. Compared with men, women give and receive more intimacy, more self-disclosures, more emotional support, and more friendly and warm nonverbal behaviors. We suggested that two kinds of predictions might follow from these sex differences. First, because lying seems so at odds with a generous, open, and revealing style of interacting, perhaps women lie much less frequently than do men. We found no evidence at all for this position.
Our alternative prediction was that women would not tell more lies overall than men would but that they would tell more of the kinds of lies that are intended to benefit other people rather than themselves. With regard to this prediction, we were partly right. In the college student study, women told significantly more other-oriented lies than did men and significantly fewer self-centered lies. The more important effect, however, was that the practice of telling kind lies was more characteristic of the dyads in which women were interacting with other women than it was of the dyads in which men were involved as liars, targets, or both. Across both studies, when men were involved in the dyads, participants told anywhere from twice as many self-centered lies as other-oriented ones to eight times as many. However, when only women were involved, the percentage of self-centered lies was virtually identical to the percentage of other-oriented ones.
Because we asked our participants to report only their lies and not their truths, we cannot know whether the sex differences in lying that we found would have been equally characteristic of truth telling. In studies of sex differences that were not specifically about deception, similar kinds of findings have been reported. For example, the results of research on self-presentational motives in everyday social interaction complement our findings on the distribution of self-centered lies in different dyad types. When women interact with each other, they are less likely to report self-promotional motives (e.g., trying to appear talented and smart) than when they interact with men or when men interact with either women or men (Leary et al., 1994) .
That women have a way of interacting with each other that is different from the way they interact with men, and especially different from the way that men interact with each other, is an idea that has been developed in anthropology and sociolinguistics as well as in psychology (see Maltz & Borker, 1982 , for a review). Maltz and Borker (1982) suggested that there is a "world of girls" with its own cultural traditions that is separate from the "world of boys"; each of these cultures is learned by boys and girls during the period of childhood when boys and girls socialize almost exclusively with children of their own gender. In all-girl groups, girls learn to use language to develop and sustain interpersonal bonds characterized by closeness and equality. For example, they learn to acknowledge each other's points and to express agreement with each other. This distinctive communication style seems to continue even into adulthood (e.g., Carli, 1989) .
A culture in which people are expected to express agreement, show support, and protect other people's feelings, however, poses a difficult dilemma to its members. What are they to do when in fact they do not agree that the other person is blameless, when they are not having a good time at her party, or when they do not like her muffins? They can try to tell the truth tactfully, or they can try to tell a small truth that covers a bigger lie (e.g., they might say that the muffins sure look pretty). These strategies are risky, however. The truth that was meant to be tactful might feel hurtful to the target, and the target might wonder why a person with a mouthful of muffin and bite marks in what is left is commenting on how pretty the muffin looks.
We suspect that when women find themselves in dilemmas like these, they do not make much of an effort to come up with tactful and truthful alternatives to their lies. Our guess is that to them, it is not so much a dilemma as a question of values, and with regard to topics such as parties, muffins, and even controversial issues, other people's feelings matter more to them than the truth. Our suggestion is not that women lie to spare other people's feelings more than men do, because sometimes they do not; they mostly lie only to spare other women's feelings.
There was one other way in which the kinds of lies that women lold to each other differed from the kinds of lies told when men were involved. In the women-only dyads, lies were disproportionately about people. It the community study, lies were about the target, and in the college student study, they were about people other than the liar or target. We already know from previous research that relative to men, women spend more of their time socializing with people (Reis, 1986) , thinking about people (McAdams & Constantian, 1983) , and perhaps also reminiscing about people (Ross & Holmberg, 1990) . We can now add to that profile the finding that women-when they are with other women-also are more inclined to tell lies about people.
If we are to take most seriously those results that were in the same direction and statistically significant (or nearly so) in both studies, then the data seem to be telling us that to understand the psychology of lying in everyday life, it will be more useful to look to the sex composition of the dyads, or even the sex of the targets of the lies, than to look to the sex of the participants (see also Deaux, 1984) . Two effects of the sex of the targets of the lies are especially noteworthy. First, in both studies, participants told relatively more self-centered lies and relatively fewer other-oriented lies to men than to women. Part of this effect is the dyad effect just described; that is, the percentage of selfcentered lies is lower, and the percentage of other-oriented lies is higher, in the dyads with only women than in any of the other three dyad types. However, the target sex effect also occurs. That is, although men do not tell as many other-oriented lies to women as other women do, or as few self-centered ones, they do tell relatively more other-oriented lies and relatively fewer selfcentered lies to women than they do to men.
There was one other way in which both men and women claimed to be trying to protect women with their lies. In both studies, participants said that the women to whom they told their lies, more so than the men, would have felt even worse if the truth had been told instead. In their inclinations to tell relatively more self-centered lies to men, and relatively more other-oriented and protective lies to women, participants seemed to be using their lies to impress men and to shield and reassure women.
Different Samples, Similar Results
Because the goals of our research included the collection of basic descriptive data about lying, we considered it important not to limit our participants to college students. Our aim in recruiting community members was not to find a representative community sample but to recruit a different and more diverse group of people than our college student group. If we could replicate our findings across two highly dissimilar groups, then we would feel much more confident about their generalizability. Many of the community members were married, had children, and were employed; a substantial percentage of them had no more than a high school education. In these ways, they were much different from the college students.
The results from the two groups were in many ways strikingly similar. Consistent with our theoretical perspective, lying in both groups was an everyday event. Also, both the college students and the community members described their everyday lies as causing them little preoccupation or regret. The relative frequencies of the many different kinds of lies were reassuringly similar across the two groups too. We were, however, intrigued by the fact that by every measure of rate of lying, the community members seemed to lie less often than the college students. Because the community members differed in many unsystematic ways from the college students, it is not appropriate to interpret these differences at this point. However, the data do point to the potential value of longitudinal studies of lying in everyday life (cf. Reis, Lin, Bennett, & Nezlek, 1993) .
Not All Lies Are Little
Our conclusions about lying are limited to the lies of everyday life, which are mostly little lies. Serious lies, which are often deep breaches of trust, occur too, but they are far less common. They are not a fact of everyday social life. To learn about them requires a different methodology. The results of the study of serious lies will be vastly different from the ones reported here. For example, serious lies are often of great cognitive and emotional significance, and the mark they leave on the lives of the liars and the targets is more than just a smudge (DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 1996) . A complete psychology of lying must include the study of both little and big lies.
Our conclusions also are importantly qualified by the fact that we Queried only the liars. The people to whom these lies were told may have a different point of view about just how little or inconsequential these lies really are or how grateful they feel for the "protection" when others lie to spare their feelings (cf. Bok, 1978) . However, as empiricists, we should not presume, in the absence of data, that the targets' perspectives will necessarily be harsher than those of the liars. Many people may prefer not to hear that their muffins are grainy or that they look like a blimp; they may prefer kind lies not only to unkind truths but even to noncommittal silences. That is for them to say.
Finally, our data do not address the question of the cumulative impact that even little lies might have over time. Once again, however, we issue the empiricists' caution not to presume the outcome of such an investigation. Those who consistently say what they think others want to hear, even when they do not really believe those things themselves, may be seen as liars, politicians, or valued colleagues and friends. That is for us to find out.
